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This paper proposes a novel way of measuring cross-national changes over time 
in the outputs of social security systems. Traditional approaches to the 
comparative analysis of social security systems use expenditure levels, regime 
types or poverty and inequality rates to rank countries and map change over 
time. All these approaches encounter the problem of determining how much of 
the observed change is due to internal developments within the social security 
system, and how much due to exogenous social and economic factors. Taking 
the example of public pensions in five European countries since 1950, this paper 
demonstrates how formal social security rules can be used in a simulation model 
to evaluate changes in public pension payments for a variety of hypothetical 
individuals characterised by different levels of lifetime income. This procedure 
produces direct measures of the impact of changes in social security systems 
which are entirely independent of exogenous developments in social and 
economic structures. This new method reveals the "pure" effect of internal social 























































































































































































The imperative for economic and administrative convergence that underlies 
European Union (EU) legislation has, as yet, had little impact on the social 
security systems of member states. Although the Treaty of Rome in 1957 gave 
the Commission the task of promoting close co-operation between member states 
in social affairs, including social security, the form of this co-operation was not 
specified. In practice neither the Treaty of Rome, nor the Single European Act, 
nor the Maastricht Treaty has given prominence to social issues, and co­
operative action towards policy convergence has been limited to a narrow range 
of employment-related matters such as equal pay and maternity leave (Hantrais, 
1995).
Social protection is potentially an important aspect of more general 
economic convergence within the EU. Non-wage labour costs (attributable 
largely to social security provision) are a significant, but highly variable, element 
of the total wage bill across EU countries; in 1984 compulsory non-wage labour 
costs varied between 5 per cent of wage costs in Denmark and 32 per cent in 
Italy (Eurostat, 1987). The receipt of public transfers and services similarly 
represents a non-trivial but internationally variable part of total income for most 
EU households. Any serious attempt to establish uniform economic conditions 
across member states would have ensure that individuals with similar social and 
economic characteristics are treated in similar ways by national social security 
systems. This implies that the outputs - in terms of individual social security 
entitlements - would need to converge towards some Europe-wide norm.
However, the European Commission (EC) has noted, in a somewhat 
defeatist tone, that systems of social protection within the member states "appear 
to be very different: indeed so different that it may seem impossible to identify 
common traits and pointless to speak of the European welfare model. Each 
nation has followed a distinct path in the development of its social policy which 
has greatly influenced the precise characteristics of the present system" (EC, 
1995: 25). Much comparative social policy analysis reinforces this view of 
national difference; researchers have identified a large number of (often 
overlapping) categories into which the separate national social security schemes
1 The pension simulation model used in this paper was developed in collaboration with Martin 
Evans, Jane Falkingham and Katherine Rake. Collection of historical data on pension system 
rules was undertaken by Angela Pearce and Iyiola Solanke, supported by a small grant from 
the 'Allegiance' project at the Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, 
Florence. I would like to thank all the above for their help in producing this paper; I am solely 



























































































can be placed: Beveridgean vs. Bismarckian; universal vs. residual; insurance- 
based vs. citizenship-based; employment-centred vs. family-centred, and so on.
Despite this consensus that European social security systems are 
characterised as much by their differences as their similarities, a number of 
recent commentators have contended that systems of social protection have 
converged in the 1990s as a consequence of financial retrenchment (Chassard 
and Quintin, 1992; Rhodes, 1997) However, they present little empirical 
evidence apart from expenditure data to support this contention and, as will be 
shown below, measures of aggregate expenditure cannot resolve the question of 
whether the outputs of European social security systems are converging. As Daly 
(1997) has noted, any discussion of convergence or divergence is practically 
meaningless in the absence of a clearly identified basis for comparison and a 
clear set of convergence criteria.
This paper develops both a clear basis for comparison of social security 
outputs, and a clear set of convergence criteria. It proposes a hitherto unexplored 
method for comparing the outputs of a number of European national social 
security systems across the five decades from the 1950s to the 1990s. The 
specific policy focus is on public pension systems because they represent the 
largest single item of social expenditure in every EU country and because 
different national pension systems appear to be governed by fundamentally 
different principles, although the methodology is applicable to a wide range of 
policy areas. The paper proceeds in four stages. The first section discusses 
conceptual and empirical difficulties in measuring social security outputs. 
Section two proposes a method, based on simulation modelling, for evaluating 
welfare system outputs while excluding the effect of exogenous social and 
economic factors. Section three applies this method to data on public pensions in 
five European countries for the period from the 1950s to the 1990s. The final 





























































































1. MEASURING SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM OUTPUTS
Comparative quantitative studies of social security systems can be thought of as 
falling into three distinct types, which we can stylise as those produced by 
"accountants", "sociologists" and "economists". The accountants' approach is 
based on the use of expenditure data as a metric of comparison. Both historical 
(Wilenskv, 1975; Flora, 1986; Lindert, 1994, 1996) and contemporary (OECD, 
1985, 1988; EC, 1995; ILO, 1984, 1992) analyses of social security systems 
adopt common accounting frameworks in an attempt to eliminate or finesse 
national institutional difference. Since the 1960s the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) has produced comparative data on 
social expenditure in the major industrialised countries. The International Labour 
Office (ILO) has produced similar data for a slightly longer period, although it 
groups expenditure under different categories. The statistical office of the EC 
broadly follows the OECD definition in its collection of data on social 
protection, but excludes education spending.
A number of problems arise in the analysis of these social expenditure 
data. As well as obvious differences in the accounting procedures adopted by the 
international agencies over what is included or excluded, there are other 
variations which emerge because national governments adopt different 
procedures in, for instance, determining whether a poor retired person receives 
financial assistance from a contributory insurance programme or a non­
contributory social assistance programme. However, even when there is a great 
degree of institutional similarity between countries in some particular part of 
their systems of social protection, it does not necessarily follow that differences 
in expenditure levels will reflect significant differences in the degree of social 
protection provided by the state. The most obvious example comes in the case of 
support for the unemployed. Luxembourg has consistently devoted a very small 
proportion of total social expenditure to unemployment benefit; in 1993 only 0.8 
per cent of total social expenditure in Luxembourg was spent on unemployment 
benefit, compared to 6 per cent in France and 12 per cent in Denmark. However, 
the unemployment rate in Luxembourg was a trivial 1.7 per cent, compared with 
over 12 per cent in both France and Denmark (EC, 1995). Clearly the variation 
in expenditure by type of benefit cannot, on its own, provide a good measure of 
the level of public social protection or the efficiency with which this expenditure 
is targeted.
Similarly, the share of total social expenditure in GDP - one of the most 
commonly used indicators to identify similarity or difference between national 
welfare states - is not an adequate performance indicator of the extent to which a 




























































































structures, or the differential impact of short-term factors such as the trade cycle, 
can mean that similar aggregate expenditure levels are catering for different 
underlying levels of demand for public welfare provision. For example, in 1990 
Denmark and France had similar aggregate levels of social expenditure (30 per 
cent and 28 per cent of GDP respectively), yet the recorded poverty rate in 
France, at 15.7 per cent, was almost double the 8 per cent in Denmark (EC, 
1995). Expenditure data, which measure aggregate financial inputs, at best 
present an indirect and imperfect measure of social security outputs, and cannot, 
therefore, be used to identify convergence over time in the performance of 
national welfare systems.
The problems and biases associated with the expenditure approach to 
welfare state performance have led many sociologists to search for a more 
encompassing comparator of welfare states. The most sophisticated approach to 
date is that developed by Esping-Andersen. He explicitly rejects expenditure 
data as a valid basis for comparing welfare state performance, stating that "the 
convention of conceptualizing welfare states in terms of their expenditures will 
no longer do" (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 3). One reason for this rejection of 
expenditure data is that, even if they are disaggregated by narrow welfare 
function, they may fail to give an appropriate indication of overall welfare 
outcomes because they provide only a partial measure of the supply of welfare 
services. Social risks may be ameliorated not only by direct public provision of 
services or via public mutual insurance schemes, but also through regulation of 
the private market (for instance by requiring employers to provide maternity 
leave) or by providing incentives for particular sorts of market-sector activity 
(for instance, giving employers tax relief on pension fund contributions). Public 
social expenditure is just one element of a "mixed economy" of welfare in which 
protection for the individual against social risks arises from a combination of 
public and private sector activity. In consequence, a purely accounting-based 
assessment of public sector social expenditure may misrepresent the underlying 
level of social security or insecurity faced by the individual.
Esping-Andersen recognises the importance of this public-private mix in 
welfare provision, particularly in the field of pensions (1990: 81-8), and in order 
to develop a taxonomy of welfare systems he attempts to rank countries both 
according to the relative size of their public and private pension expenditures, 
and by the source of pensioner income. However, his ultimate objective is not to 
present a detailed analysis of the performance - in terms of either inputs or 
outputs - of different national welfare systems. He argues that "expenditures are 
epiphenomenal to the theoretical substance of welfare states" (Esping-Andersen, 
1990: 19), and instead he uses empirical data to support a three-way 




























































































"decommodification" - the degree to which social policies make individuals (and 
families) independent of the market for income and consumption.
There are a number of problems in attempting to use the concept of 
distinct welfare state regimes to study the issue of convergence over time. First, 
there has been considerable debate about which countries should be allocated to 
Esping-Andersen's three welfare regimes, and about whether there should be 
four (or more) different regimes (Leibfried, 1992; Castles and Mitchell, 1993; 
Kloosterman, 1995; Ferrera, 1996). The association of countries with any 
particular regime type is contestable and may depend on the positioning of 
thresholds between regime types or on the criteria chosen to determine national 
rankings. Secondly, a number of authors have noted that Esping-Andersen's 
regime theory is more appropriate to the analysis of welfare state stability than to 
dynamic change. In particular, it is rooted in a 1970s classification of welfare 
regimes and fails to take account of fundamental changes that have occurred in 
the past two decades in the nature of citizenship rights (Taylor-Gooby, 1996; 
Cox, 1998). Taken together, these two problems render it impossible to use the 
concept of welfare regimes to identify or measure convergence or divergence 
over time. Convergence might imply a reallocation of countries between regime 
types, but since this allocation is itself a matter of dispute, reallocation may be 
the result of different judgements made by different authors, rather than a 
reflection of genuine changes in welfare state performance. Furthermore, even if 
both the criteria used to determine national rankings and the thresholds between 
different regimes could be determined in a completely unambiguous and 
incontestable way, it might still be impossible to develop a clear measure of 
convergence or divergence of welfare state performance. This is a common 
problem in the measurement of the characteristics of groups; it is quite possible 
for between-group difference to widen and within-group difference to narrow, 
and vice-versa.
Whereas the regime approach favoured by many sociologists emphasises 
the importance of origins and welfare ideology in categorising welfare systems, 
economists have taken a resolutely empirical route to the analysis of welfare 
state outcomes. Starting from the rather narrow principle that a primary function 
of a welfare state is to prevent poverty, and recognising that this can be done 
redistributing some resources from richer to poorer members of society, 
economists have developed a number of "output" measures; the two most 
frequently used are the proportion of the population living below some poverty 
line, and the degree of income inequality in any society.
Measuring either poverty or income inequality in Europe is no easy task. 




























































































decisions about what income to include, how to define poverty, and whether to 
study families, households, or individuals, can all affect the conclusions. 
Atkinson (1995) has drawn together much of the evidence on income inequality 
in a comparative analysis for the 1980s and has concluded that the Scandinavian 
countries, Benelux and West Germany have apparently distinctly less inequality 
in disposable income; Southern Europe and Ireland have distinctly higher 
inequality, with France and, to some degree, the UK and Italy occupying an 
intermediate position.
This geographical pattern to income inequality reflects a general gradient 
in social expenditure, with Scandinavia, Benelux and Germany devoting 
considerably higher shares of GDP to welfare spending than Mediterranean 
countries and Ireland. This appears to indicate that a higher level of social 
protection, and the redistributive system of income taxation with which this is 
associated, is effective in reducing inequality. However, a longer-run analysis 
demonstrates that the relationship between income inequality and the level of 
social expenditure is not this straightforward. In the 1970s, when social 
expenditure was rising rapidly in most European countries, income inequality 
was falling fairly consistently. In the 1980s, as the rate of growth of social 
expenditure fell, income inequality began to increase in most countries, but not 
in all. According to Atkinson, income inequality and the proportionate level of 
social expenditure were both virtually constant in Germany between 1980 and 
the early 1990s, whereas in the Netherlands and in the UK inequality rose over 
this period despite an expansion of the social sector.
Data on poverty show a similar pattern to that for income inequality. The 
EC defines people as living in poverty if they have an income of less than 50 per 
cent of the average income for their country. According to this definition, the 
proportion of the EC population living in poverty has grown from 12.6 per cent 
in 1975 to 13.7 per cent in 1988 and 14.7 per cent in 1992. This increase in 
poverty coincides with the general growth of income inequality in the 1980s, and 
in the slow-down in the rate of growth of social expenditure. Taking data for a 
range of eight EC countries for 1991 reveals a correlation of -0.91 between the 
poverty rate and the proportion of GDP devoted to social expenditure (EC, 
1995). However, these data on poverty rates and income inequality are, at best, 
very weak indicators of welfare state convergence or divergence over time. The 
reason for this is that many influences on both poverty rates and income 
inequality are entirely exogenous to the public welfare system. Welfare states 
might all be converging in terms of expenditure shares, and might all be shifting 
in structure and ideology towards a Bismarckian or a Scandinavian model, yet 
poverty rates and income inequality could be diverging because of different 




























































































structure, marriage and divorce rates, and so on. Conversely, cross-national 
indicators of poverty and income inequality might become more similar because 
of common patterns of social and economic change, even though systems of 
welfare provision remain unchanged.
None of the three stylised approaches to comparative welfare state 
analysis - the accountants' evaluation of expenditure shares, the sociologists' 
construction of welfare regimes, and the economists' comparison of inequality 
and poverty rates - produces the precise measure of social security outputs that 
would be needed to assess whether or not there has been convergence across 
European countries over time. Any attempt to conduct comparative analyses of 
welfare state outputs faces the problem that many factors which are unrelated to 
the design and operation of the public welfare system will have an effect on the 
outcomes of that system. Unless the impact of these exogenous factors can be 
accurately assessed or held constant, it is not possible to make valid comparisons 
across countries or over time. The next section outlines a method for measuring 
the "pure" impact of social security provision, independent of all exogenous 
social and economic influences.
2. SIMULATION MODELLING WITH HYPOTHETICAL INDIVIDUALS
Social security systems are sets of rules which impose (direct or indirect) 
contributions on people on account of their income, wealth, or labour market 
status, and which grant benefits according to entitlements which arise either 
because of past behaviour (such as contribution into the system) or because of 
current status (being widowed, poor, disabled, etc.). If we wish to address the 
specific question "Have social security systems become more similar over time?" 
then we are really asking whether these sets of rules have become more alike. 
We can investigate this possibility by examining how different sets of national 
social security rules affect the benefit outcomes that are received by individuals 
who are identical in all respects except for the social security regime under 
which they live their lives.
This type of comparison is difficult to achieve even in an approximate 
manner with representative survey data derived from a range of countries. The 
only major source of comparable European household data is that assembled by 
the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). This allows for a fairly close matching 
across countries of households by size and structure, income, wealth and labour 
force participation, and so provides considerable scope for assessing the relative 
impact of national social security systems in, for example, ameliorating poverty. 




























































































social security systems from other unique national attributes such as labour 
market or demographic structures. For example, LIS data may indicate that 
public pension income is significantly higher in one country than another for a 
matched group of retirees. This might reflect differences in the rules of the two 
public pension systems, but alternatively it may be compatible with identical 
rules, and instead reflect different working life histories in the two countries, 
brought about by long-run differences in the pattern of economic growth and 
structural change. Income data alone cannot distinguish between these 
possibilities, and no comparative European longitudinal data set exists that could 
resolve this issue of causation.
There are two further limitations to the use of LIS (or similar) data sets in 
addressing the question of whether social security systems have become more 
similar over time. First, the geographical coverage tends to be patchy; there is, 
for instance, no LIS data on France for the 1990s. Secondly, and more important 
for the study of policy convergence over time, the majority of household income 
datasets relate to the period since the mid-1980s. There is no LIS data for any 
country for the period before 1967, and that for years prior to 1979 is confined to 
a historical database which does not attempt to provide the same degree of 
standardisation of income measures that has been achieved for more recent 
studies.2 This is a major obstacle to the use of LIS data for the analysis of long- 
run trends in social security convergence or divergence, since the more general 
availability of data from the early/mid 1980s coincides with a general 
retrenchment in welfare state expenditure. In order to separate the effects of 
retrenchment from any more general process of convergence, a longer run of 
observations is needed which includes the period of welfare state expansion up 
to the mid-1970s.
Given the limitations of using survey data to address the question of 
whether social security systems have become more similar over time, this paper 
adopts a different and novel approach. It examines social security outcomes 
(specifically pension system outcomes) in a stylised world in which all other 
economic and social interactions are held constant. In order to isolate one or 
more public social security systems from the economic environment(s) in which 
they operate, the rules of contribution, benefit and entitlement are programmed 
into a simulation model of life-time contribution and benefit. Once these 
parameters have been established, a hypothetical individual, with any chosen set 
of characteristics of labour force participation, earnings, and retirement is 
allowed to "live" through an entire contribution/benefit life-cycle in each stylised
2 Details of the coverage of LIS datasets are most readily obtained from the Luxembourg 




























































































social security system, and the pension benefit entitlements accumulated in the 
different systems at the point of retirement are then compared. This allows us to 
assess the "pure" impact of different pension systems, unaffected by other 
economic factors.
This type of simulation modelling does not, of course, produce a 
representation of real social security outcomes; it instead shows how the social 
security systems of different countries would treat identical individuals, in the 
absence of any other economic, social or demographic effects. In practice 
national social security rules interact with national conditions to produce the 
"real" outcomes. But it must be stressed that the purpose of the simulation is not 
to derive international comparisons of actual pensioner welfare; instead the 
objective is to evaluate the pure effect of different sets of public pension rules. 
Many assertions about the outputs of different European public pension systems 
- for instance that the German system is much more generous than the British, or 
that the Swedish system is the most egalitarian - have never been directly tested. 
Such claims are commonly supported by reference to data on pensioner poverty 
or pensioner incomes, but as we have already noted, these data do not allow us to 
distinguish between the autonomous workings of the public pension system and 
its interaction with a variety of exogenous economic and social factors. We can 
only determine the direct impact of different public pension systems by 
examining on an exactly comparable basis how their rules generate pension 
entitlements.
It should be noted that a further attribute of this type of simulation model, 
when applied to pension rules, is that it directly compares the impact of national 
public pension rules current at one moment in time, whereas any empirical 
analysis of the sources of pensioner income inevitably conflates the influence of 
current pension rules and past sets of pension rules. A crucial distinction 
between public pension systems and most other elements of the welfare state is 
that pensions involve long-term (implicit or explicit) contracts, whereas 
unemployment or sickness or maternity benefit is a short-term payment made in 
response to immediate circumstances. Because social security systems and rules 
have changed in all European countries a great deal since the Second World 
War, people entering retirement today have lived through a number of different 
public pension regimes, and their actual public pension entitlement is a function 
of both their personal career history and the institutional history of their national 
pension system. Household survey data on the sources of pensioner income is 
not sufficiently rich to allow for the separation of the relative impact of these 
two parallel histories for any individual pensioner. In the simulation approach 
adopted here any pensioner is assumed to have lived their entire working life 




























































































retirement. This means that, in making cross-national comparisons of public 
pension benefits, we can be sure that any differences are a direct function of the 
detailed pension rules in operation at any point in time.
This paper uses a variant of a comparative pension simulation model 
PHYLIS (Pension and Hypothetical Lifetime Income Simulation), which was 
designed to allow a direct comparison of the impact of contemporary public 
pension rules on pension outcomes in a number of European and other countries 
(Evans and Falkingham, 1997; Johnson and Rake, 1997). Here the model is 
extended to examine change over time as well as national variation. The public 
pension systems for five European countries - France, Germany, Spain, Sweden 
and the UK - have been have modelled for each of the five decades from the 
1950s to the 1990s; the objective is to determine whether pension outcomes have 
converged over that period.
Convergence of pension outcomes is not, however, an unambiguous 
concept. Schmahl (1993) has noted that concepts of convergence or 
harmonisation of pensions can be applied loosely and inconsistently to the legal 
structure, the public/private mix, the method of financing, the level of 
expenditure and the level of pension income. Most of these ambiguities are 
avoided in this paper by a clear focus on the level of public pension income as 
the sole criterion for evaluation. However, this criterion is less simple than it 
first appears once we take into account both the multiple functions of a public 
pension system and the diverse circumstances of pension scheme members.
Public pension schemes are commonly required to meet two distinct 
objectives - the prevention of pensioner poverty and the replacement in old age 
of the worker's former level of income. Since the first objective can only be 
achieved by transfers towards poorer elderly people, and since these transfers 
must come from higher-income individuals, the degree of internal redistribution 
within a pension scheme can be taken as an indicator of the balance between 
these two objectives, though as will be shown below, it does not always provide 
an unambiguous measure. Convergence of pension systems towards providing 
more similar levels of income replacement in old age need not imply 
convergence in achieving poverty prevention, and vice versa. This is particularly 
apparent if instead of just examining the pension outcomes for a "typical" 
individual, we also look at outcomes for high and low earners. Pension systems 
may, for instance, converge in their treatment of people with low lifetime 
earnings and diverge in their treatment of high income individuals.
In order to explore these possibilities, pension outcomes are simulated for 




























































































and 400 per cent of the average earnings in each country in each time period. 
These individuals are assumed to work full time from the age of 18 to the 
"normal" age of retirement when they can claim a full public pension (this age 
varies by decade and country between 60 and 67). The earnings profile is 
assumed to be flat throughout working life, and public pension entitlements are 
based upon the rules current in the year of retirement. The simulation model 
estimates the value of the monthly (or in the case of the UK, weekly) pension in 
current prices.
3. SIMULATION MODEL RESULTS
The PHYL1S model has been parameterised with the contribution, entitlement 
and benefit rules of the public pension systems of all five countries at 
approximately ten year intervals from 1954.3 For each hypothetical individual 
for each year the model produces three separate indicators of public pension 
performance:
i) the pension as a proportion of average economy-wide wage
ii) the pension as a proportion of own final wage
iii) the pension as a proportion of average pension
The first of these provides information about poverty prevention, the second 
about income replacement, the third about the degree of cross-sectional 
redistribution that occurs within the pension system. Before examining this data 
for evidence of convergence over time, we can first see whether the model 
reveals a clear differentiation in the outputs of public pension systems in the 
1980s which is in conformity with the different welfare state regimes proposed 
by Esping-Andersen and others. Here we take Sweden to be representative of the 
social democratic model, France and Germany to be representative of the 
conservative/corporatist welfare state, and the UK to be a (weak) example the 
liberal welfare state. Since other scholars have suggested that Esping-Andersen's 
tripartite division is inappropriate to much of the world beyond North and West 
Europe (Ferrera, 1996), we also examine pension outputs for Spain which we 
take to be representative of a Southern European welfare model.
3 The absence of appropriate information on pension rules in certain years has necessitated 
some minor variation of the decadal intervals. Data is derived from: Callund 1975; Foster, 
1988; ILO 1956 et seq.\ISSA, 1958; MISSOC, 1995; Noble Lowndes, 1970; OECD 1970, 
1988; US, 1964; Wilson, 1974. The Swedish pension rales for the 1990s are based on the 




























































































Figures 1-3 shows how the five public pension systems modelled in 
PHYLIS treated individuals with different levels of average earnings in the 
1980s. Figure 1 plots the pension as a proportion of average earnings. Here the 
key issue is the extent to which the public pension system prevents people with 
low life-time income from falling into poverty in old age. Whilst the German 
and UK systems produced particularly low pensions for those with low life-time 
incomes, none of the pensions systems at the time generated a pension of more 
than 50 per cent of average income (a standard EU poverty line) for individuals 
hi and h2. The UK system had least success in preventing poverty since it failed 
to give people on average earnings (h3) a pension income above this poverty 
line. There is little indication in Figure 1 that the social democratic Swedish 
public pension system in the 1980s was markedly more successful than the 
conservative/corporatist French pension system in generating adequate pensions 
for people with low life-time incomes. The UK public pension, however, does 
have the minimalist properties characteristic of a residual liberal welfare regime.
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Figure 2 illustrates the effectiveness of the pension systems in replacing earnings 
(this is essentially the same data as in Figure 1, but rescaled by the income shares 
of the hypothetical individuals). Not surprisingly, replacement rates were higher 
for low income individuals. Only the Spanish system generated a replacement 
rate greater than 50 per cent for individuals with earnings more than twice the 
national average, and in common with the German system, it provided constant 
replacement rates across a wide earnings band. This lends support to Esping- 
Andersen's claims that there is a close correspondence between 
conservative/corporatist welfare regimes and those identified by Ferrera as 
distinctly Southern European.
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Figure 3, which shows the pension as a proportion of the average pension, can 
be interpreted as displaying the degree of internal redistribution within each 
national pension system. A horizontal line at the 100 per cent level would 
indicate extensive redistribution, with all pensioners receiving the same pension, 
regardless of their former level of earnings and contribution. As this line pivots 
towards a diagonal from bottom left to top right, so the degree of redistribution 




























































































pre-retirement income. Here, somewhat surprisingly, it is the French and British 
pensions, rather than the Swedish, that appear to be the most redistributive. 
Looking across all three figures, it can be seen that the UK pension system in the 
1980s had the worst record for poverty prevention for people earning up to 100 
per cent of average earnings, produced the lowest replacement rates for 
individuals earning at least half the national average, yet it had one of the highest 
levels of internal redistribution of any of the national pension systems. Once we 
allow for pension outcomes to vary with the distribution of life-time income, we 
can see that there is no necessary connection, or trade-off, between having a 
pension system that prevents poverty, that replaces former earnings, and that 
redistributes internally between high and low earners. It is, therefore, rather 
difficult to map these public pension outcomes onto a 2-way or 3-way or 4-way 
categorisation of welfare states.
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Bearing in mind this potential ambiguity of pension outcomes, we can turn to the 
major concern of this paper - the degree of convergence or divergence of 
pension outcomes over time. In order to generate comparable indicators of 
convergence or divergence, we have calculated the coefficient of variation of the 




























































































individual in each decade.4 Thus, starting with 1950s data on the pension as a 
percentage of average earnings, we find that for hypothetical individual hi the 
percentages for France, Germany, Spain, Sweden and the UK are 25, 15, 27, 11 
and 20 per cent respectively, and the coefficient of variation is 0.30. Figure 4 
shows the extent to which the variance across countries in the pension outcomes 
for each of the hypothetical individuals rises or falls from decade to decade. It 
can be seen that there has been a consistent process of harmonisation of pension 
outcomes across these five countries for individuals with above average earnings 
(h4 and h5). Between the 1960s and the 1980s there has also been harmonisation 
of outcomes for people earning 50 per cent and 100 per cent of average income 
(h2 and h3), although the last decade has seen a clear reversal of this trend. For 
those with consistently very low incomes (hi) there has been no significant 
change over time - the inter-country variation in pension outcomes has been 
fairly low and stable.




- * - h 3  
- x - h 4  
—*— h5
Decades
4 Note that the coefficient of variation will be identical for the poverty prevention measure 
(pension as a proportion of average earnings) and the income replacement measure (pension 




























































































Clearly the answer to the question "has there been convergence of public pension 
outcomes?" depends on which group in the population is the subject of enquiry. 
For very low earners stylised as hi the answer is no, for very high earners, the 
answer is yes, whereas for average or slightly below average earners the answer 
depends on the specific time period chosen. However, a response to a question 
about convergence also depends upon which aspect of pension system 
performance is being examined. Figure 4 shows the extent of convergence of 
outcomes across countries within each hypothetical earning category. This 
reveals the extent to which the public pensions of individuals who all earn an 
identical percentage of average income become more or less similar across 
countries over time.
An alternative concept of convergence might relate to the spread of 
pension incomes, and whether public pension systems have become more or less 
redistributive over time. This issue can be addressed by examining the variance 
of pension outcomes across each hypothetical earning category within each 
country. The procedure can be illustrated by looking at Figure 3, which shows 
the value of the pension for each of the hypothetical individuals as a proportion 
of the average pension in each country in the 1980s. From these data we can 
calculate the coefficient of variation of pension outcomes across the earnings 
range; for the 1980s France has the lowest spread, with a coefficient of variation 
of 0.28, and Spain has the widest spread, with a coefficient of 0.63. Figure 5 
plots these coefficients of variation of pension outcomes within countries, for 
each country and for each decade. In the 1950s, Spain, Sweden and the UK all 
had a flat-rate pension system, so they had zero variance of pension outcomes. 
There was an abrupt shift to an earnings-related pension system in Sweden in the 
1950s and in Spain in the 1960s. The French system became less earnings- 
related between the 1960s and the 1980s; the UK pension system became 
marginally earnings-related in the late 1950s with the introduction of a graduated 
pension, more so with the introduction of the State Earnings Related Pension 
Scheme in 1975, and then less so after the scaling back of this scheme from 
1986. Figure 5 reveals a much less straightforward picture of change over time 




























































































Figure 5: Variation of pension 
outcomes within countries
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In order to present a clearer picture of aggregate trends over time, Figure 6 plots 
the mean decadal values of the coefficients of variation of the level of pension 
income within hypothetical income ranges (from Figure 4) and of the 
distribution of pension income across pension income ranges (from Figure 5). 
This shows that whereas the variation of pension outcomes within specific 
income ranges has converged over time across the five countries, the variation of 
pension outcomes across the income ranges within countries has grown over 




























































































Figure 6: Alternative measures of 
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Decades
. ASSESSMENT
This paper has attempted to evaluate evidence for a convergence in the outputs 
of public pension systems in Europe since the 1950s. Many discussions of social 
policy development use qualitative evidence about initial conditions and 
underlying philosophies to establish distinctions between alternative social 
policy regimes. Quantitative assessments of social policy convergence use 
expenditure data or indirect outcome measures such as poverty rates or income 
distribution. None of these can produce a direct assessment of policy 
convergence, since they cannot isolate the impact of the social security system 
itself from exogenous economic and social factors. This paper has proposed a 
method for using detailed public pension system rules to simulate pension 
outcomes for a limited range of hypothetical individuals. This procedure ensures 
that reported changes in pension outcomes from one decade to the next are solely 
a consequence of the evolution of pension rules, rather than the results of an 
interaction between the pension system and the labour market, social structure, 
etc.
A number of strong "health warnings" must be attached to the results 
presented here, which are offered by way of an example of how this method 
might be applied, rather than as a fully developed test of the convergence 
hypothesis. First, the five countries used in the analysis are not in any sense 
"representative" of a European norm. They were selected because they have been 
identified in the literature on regime theory as being characteristic of distinct 
welfare regimes. A different, or larger, panel of countries might produce 





























































































Secondly, the results presented above will be sensitive to the 
characteristics of the hypothetical individuals used in the analysis. This 
sensitivity is both substantive and statistical. Personal attributes have a major 
impact on the way in which public pension rights are accumulated. In the 
example above the hypothetical individuals were assumed to have identical 
lifetime labour participation records (full employment) and to differ only in 
terms of the level of their income. Other characteristics - such as interrupted 
employment histories, or significant periods of part-time work, might be treated 
very differently by the public pension systems across the five countries, and 
might produce substantively different patterns in the time profile of pension 
benefits to those reported here. A wide range of differently characterised 
hypothetical individuals can be programmed into a model of this sort in order to 
examine how the evolution of public pension systems may have had diverse 
effects on different sub-groups of the population.
The results are sensitive to the characteristics of the hypothetical 
individuals in a statistical sense because in the figures reported above each 
hypothetical individual receives equal weighting. This obviously biases the 
findings in favour of the experience of the population outliers who are 
exceptionally low or high earners, receiving respectively 25 and 400 per cent of 
average earnings. A larger number of hypothetical individuals, or a greater 
weight given to those towards the middle of the income distribution, might 
change the findings. In fact the results turn out to be relatively robust to changes 
in composition. Figure 7 shows that the measures of convergence generated by 
taking only those three hypothetical individuals with income in the range 50-200 
per cent of the average are very similar to the measures generated by including 
all five hypothetical individuals. Of course this finding that the results are 
insensitive to major compositional changes may not hold for other sets of 





























































































Figure 7: Effect on measures of 
convergence of a narrowing of the income 






Bearing in mind these health warnings, what can this exercise in the quantitative 
evaluation of the impact of public pension system rules tell us? First, the outputs 
of the simulation model demonstrate that "convergence" is a slippery and ill- 
defined concept. In general, for individuals receiving identical percentages of 
average earnings, the pension outcomes across the five countries included in the 
model have become more similar over time. This is probably the relevant 
measure of convergence from an economic perspective; labour market 
integration will be encouraged by ensuring that an individual who earns some 
given level of income will not suffer a large change in their public pension 
entitlement by moving to another EU country. On the other hand, the simulation 
results also show that the variation of pension outcomes between high and low 
earners within countries has widened over time, at least up to the 1980s. This 
may be the more significant measure for those seeking to determine whether the 
public pension systems of these five countries have become more or less similar 
in their degree of redistribution over time. A further concern might be with the 
extent to which the national pension systems differ in their treatment of the very 
low paid. The data for the lowest paid hypothetical individual (hi) presented in 
Figure 4 shows that the cross-country variation in public pension provision for 
the very low paid has always been low, but has not changed over half a century 
of welfare state development. Depending on the question asked and the sub­
group investigated, it is possible to argue that public pension provision across a 




























































































unchanged over the past half-century. This indicates that future discussion of 
social policy convergence (and of international differences in social policy 
regimes) needs to be much more clearly specified. Commentators need to be 
explicit about the criteria they wish to use to assess convergence (for instance 
income replacement, or redistribution, or poverty prevention) and the sub-groups 
of the population with which they are primarily concerned.
Second, the model identifies the key structural changes to national pension 
systems as occurring in the 1960s and 70s. The data in Figure 4 (summarised as 
the "level" indicator in Figures 6 and 7) show that it was in these decades that 
the five national public pension systems became much more similar in terms of 
the pension benefits they granted to people with a full employment history and 
with income at or around the average. This was a consequence of a general shift 
towards incorporating an eamings-related element in the pension systems. This 
substitution of earnings-related for flat-rate pensions is the primary reason for 
the widening of within-country public pension inequality (Figure 5, and the 
"distribution" indicator in Figures 6 and 7). It should be noted that these 
common trends occurred despite the absence of explicit policy harmonisation, 
and despite the maintenance of long-established Beveridgean and Bismarckian 
traditions in the different social security systems. It would appear, therefore, that 
it is possible to achieve similar trends in policy outcomes in different countries 
without convergence of the administrative, legal or financial bases of the 
different national social security systems. This should be good news for those 
who wish to see a move to more standardised social protection in Europe, and 
who have been dismayed by the slow legislative progress towards a common EU 
social policy.
Third, the model confirms that long-established trends in social security 
development have been reversed since the mid-1980s. However, in this cross­
national analysis of public pension outcomes, this reversal appears to be the 
opposite of that which has commonly been identified (Daly, 1997; Rhodes, 
1997). It is not that financial retrenchment since the 1980s has made public 
pension outcomes more similar, but rather that retrenchment has reversed a trend 
towards harmonisation and has increased the variance across countries in the 
level of income provided for similar individuals through the public pension 
system. Pension systems may have converged along other dimensions - for 
instance through a general encouragement of private pension provision, or an 
increase in the normal retirement age - but by the specific criterion measured in 




























































































The use of a simulation model to apply precise national social security 
benefit entitlement rules to the circumstances of a number of identical 
hypothetical individuals is not intended to substitute for the analysis of income, 
inequality and poverty through the use of large-scale household datasets. The 
simulation approach presented here cannot produce a representation of real 
social security outcomes. On the other hand, nor can the traditional empirical 
approaches, because they cannot isolate the impact of the social security system 
from all other social and economic factors that may influence final income. The 
simulation approach is a useful supplement to more traditional approaches, and 
has three particular advantages. First, it is very economical - it requires only the 
formal rules of a social security system, rather than extensive information on 
household income and expenditure. Second, and as a consequence of this first 
advantage, it can be used to examine some of the details of social security 
outputs in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, decades for which we have little or no 
appropriate household data. Third, it produces comparative data on the "pure" 
impact of different national social security systems, something that cannot be 
directly achieved by any other means.
Paul Johnson
Department of Economic History 
London School o f Economics 
Houghton Street 
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